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The current political pressures on the welfare state, induced both by fiscal
pressures and a Republican majority in Congress, have prompted some of its
defenders to look for solutions at state and local levels. They point out that the
American federal system is open, complex, and pluralist. Problems that cannot
be addressed at one level are often resolved at another. Interests that cannot
gain representation in Washington get heard in Albany, Springfield, and
Sacramento.' They remind us that state and local governments filled in many
programmatic gaps opened up by the Reagan Administration. Such optimism,
t Henry Shattuck Professor of Government and Director, Center for American Political Studies,
Department of Government, Harvard University.
1. Cf. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966) (describing complex interdependence and sharing of power
between federal and state governments in American federalism).
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however, is misguided. Current proposals for devolution differ markedly from
those of the 1980s. While the Reagan devolution was mainly limited to the
developmental or productivity policy arena, the Gingrich devolution promises
to shape redistributive policy. This distinction is important because the impact
of devolution varies greatly depending on the policy arena in which it occurs.
I. DEVELOPMENTAL VS. REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY
Traditionally, states and localities have assumed primary responsibility for
managing the physical and social infrastructure-roads, education, mass transit
systems, public parks, police and fire services, and sanitation systems-
necessary for the country's economic growth. I call these kinds of policies
developmental because without them economic progress would be retarded. In
contrast, state and local governments tend to play only a minor role in serving
the needs of the disabled, the unemployed, the sick, the poor, families headed
by single parents, the elderly, and others dependent on the welfare state. I refer
to these policies as redistributive because they shift resources from the "haves"
to the "have-nots."
State and local developmental spending has always exceeded that of the
national government. Even after the great growth in federal spending during
the Great Society, federal expenditures were only half that of state and local
governments. In 1990, states and localities were spending 10.8% of GNP on
the country's developmental infrastructure, while the national government was
spending only 5.2% of GNP.2
With regard to redistributive expenditures, the story is entirely different.
Since 1962, the state and local share of the country's expenditures on the
elderly, the poor, and the needy has steadily declined. While national
government redistributive spending more than doubled, from 4.9% of GNP in
1962 to 10.3% in 1990, state and local redistributive spending edged up only
slightly, from a very low 2.2% of GNP in 1962 to 3.5% in 1990. 3 The modest
growth in state and local spending levels is particularly striking as this was also
the period in which the civil rights movement awakened the country to
problems of poverty, the Great Society was introduced, and entitlements
became an entrenched part of American social policy.
The reluctance of state and local governments to participate in the
redistributive movement can hardly be attributed to the political climate. Over
most of this period Democrats controlled at least part of state government in
most states, and they held unified control in several. Differences in state and
local treatment of development and redistributive policies are rooted not in
2. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 66, 70-71 (1995).
3. Id.
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partisan politics but in underlying features of the federal system. 4
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
State and local governments are efficient mechanisms for supplying most
of the physical and social infrastructure needed for economic development. In
providing roads, schools, sanitation systems, and public safety to their
residents, state and local governments must be sensitive to local businesses and
residents. If they ignore their constituencies, people will vote with their feet
and move to another town. Since seventeen percent of the population changes
residence each year, the effects of locational choices on property values can be
quickly felt. Moreover, if a state or community makes a poor policy choice,
its failure will soon become apparent and other communities will learn from the
mistake. If it chooses wisely, its policy will be copied-and thus be disseminat-
ed throughout the federal system.
I. REDISTRIBUTION
For the same reason that local governments are well-suited to providing
economic development-the mobility of labor and capital-they are not
effective at redistributing wealth. For example, local governments avoid pro-
gressive income taxes. Only about three percent of local revenues comes from
this source.5 Any locality making a serious attempt to tax high-income groups
and give to the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive away the most
productive contributors to the local economy. No amount of determination on
the part of local political leaders can make redistributive efforts succeed. If no
other force is able to stop their efforts, bankruptcy will.
The smaller the territorial reach of a local government, the less its capacity
for redistribution. Most small suburbs in metropolitan areas have almost no
capacity to meet the special needs of low-income citizens because the effects
of such actions would immediately be felt in the suburb's tax rate, property
values, and attractiveness to business. Big cities are somewhat better able to
undertake redistribution because of their greater geographical reach and control
over extremely valuable land at the heart of the nation's transportation system.
The greater territorial reach of states also makes them better at redistribu-
tion than most local governments. The costs of moving across state lines is
more substantial than changing residence within a metropolitan area. As
opposed to the 17% of the population who change residence every year, only
3 % move across a state line.6 Even so, labor and capital can and do move,
4. Though partisan factors have some effects on state policy-making, economic factors are much
more important. For an extended discussion, see generally PErERSON, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 20.
6. Id. at30.
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and states must take that possibility into account in their policymaking.
Current economic trends are further limiting state and local redistributive
capacity. Capital, entrepreneurial activity, and skilled labor have become ever
more mobile. State and local governments now face increasingly competitive
relationships with each other and must attend ever more strictly to economic
development. The result is that they are growing ever more reluctant to provide
for the needy within their ranks. In 1962, states and localities accounted for
31% of the nation's redistributive expenditure; in 1990, they accounted for
only 25%. 7
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REAGAN AND GINGRICH DEVOLUTIONS
Reagan promised and Gingrich promises to devolve government to state and
local levels; however the consequences of enacting these policies would differ
gravely. Reagan devolved a good deal of responsibility for developmental
policy, thereby strengthening the federal system in many important ways.
Gingrich is proposing to devolve a wide range of redistributive policies. His
devolution, if enacted into law, proposes to transform welfare and Medicaid
entitlement programs into block grants.
A. Reagan's Devolution
The federal system responded well to Reagan cutbacks and retrenchments.
Between 1982 and 1990, federal education aid was cut from 0.8% to 0.74%
of GNP, but state and local education expenditures climbed from 4.4% to 4.9%
of GNP, an increase of no less than $83.3 billion (in constant 1990 dollars).'
Over this same period, total federal grants to state and local governments were
downsized from 2.8% to 2.5% of GNP; yet state and local governments
increased total expenditures from their own sources from 12.4% to 14.3% of
GNP.9
A number of factors helped state and local governments plug the holes left
by national policy. For example, Democrats remained the dominant force at the
lower tiers of government. State revenues were not as crimped as federal ones.
After federal income taxes were indexed to changes in the cost of living in
1981, the federal government could no longer enjoy silent increases in tax
revenues generated by the shift of taxpayers into higher tax brackets simply as
7. See id. at 54. It might be argued that this change is due mainly to an increase in redistributive
spending at the federal level. But one needs to explain why the federal government responded to
constituent demands for increased levels of redistributive spending, while state and local governments
did not. If states and local governments did not operate under a structural constraint, they should have
responded in a similar manner. After all, the sum total of all state and local governments has exactly
the same constituency as the national government.
8. See id. at 66, 70-71.
9. Id. at 74, 54.
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a result of inflation, a phenomenon known as "bracket creep." Most state and
local governments' tax systems were not subjected to similar provisions.
Although property taxes were capped in such states as California and
Massachusetts, many state income tax systems, not indexed to the cost of
living, retained significant bracket creep. Though tax revolts broke out, they
were frequently offset by silent tax increases resulting from these bracket
creeps.
Most importantly, Reagan cuts focused not on the safety net but on
traditional public services. Developmental grants were cut from 1.5 % to 1.1%
of GNP between 1982 and 1990,10 general revenue sharing with state and
local governments was entirely eliminated, and sizeable cuts were made in
education and community development block grants. At the same time,
welfare, food stamp, and medicaid policies were left virtually untouched. Over-
all, redistributive grants actually increased from 1.3% to 1.4% of GNP."'
Because Reagan cuts focused on developmental policies, state and local
governments responded by substituting local revenues for federal ones.
Although, there was no one-for-one replacement of each federal program,
states and localities had strong incentives to continue to provide the public
services their constituents wanted and needed.
B. Gingrich's Devolution
Unlike the Reagan devolution, the Gingrich devolution has sought to make
major changes in the federal government's role in the provision of a broad
range of redistributive services. For example, the Congressional Budget
Resolution for Fiscal Year 1996 dramatically reshaped the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Under the legislation vetoed by
President Clinton, each state was to receive a block grant equivalent to the
amount of funding it received in 1994. A special fund was set aside to help
assist states experiencing overall population growth. The grant contained no
provisions for any inflation that might occur over the next seven years. If
inflation were to grow at an average rate of 3% per year, the legislation
implies a 25 % effective reduction-even assuming no growth in the number of
needy families, an heroic assumption.
Growth in Medicaid, according to the budget resolution, is to be 7.2% in
1996, 6.8% in 1997, and 4% in the last five years of the plan. These rates fall
far short of the 10% growth rate projected by the Congressional Budget Office,
if current policies remain in place.
10. Id. at 74.
11. Id.
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V. WELFARE POLICY: THE CURRENT RACE TO THE BOTIoM
The probable effects of the proposed block grants on state welfare and
Medicaid policies can be estimated by examining state policies under the
current AFDC program. The federal government sets minimum standards and
pays at least half the cost of AFDC in all states. In the states with the lowest
per capita income, the federal share is over 80%. But even though costs are
shared, states have extensive authority to set eligibility requirements and
benefit levels.
Before 1970, shared federal and state funding of AFDC did not preclude
a steady rise in welfare benefits. The mean benefit paid to a family in the
average state climbed from $306 in 1940 to $605 in 1970 (calculated in 1993
dollars).' 2 This steady increase was made possible by both steady economic
growth and the fact that each state could set its policies without worrying too
much about what its neighbors were doing.
State AFDC policies began to change around 1970. Instead of increasing
over time, they began a retreat that has accelerated over the years. By 1975,
the mean cash benefit in the average state had slipped to $512; by 1985, it had
fallen to $393; and by 1993, it reached its postwar nadir of $349. 13 All in all,
cuts between 1970 and 1993 amounted to no less than 42%.
VI. THE WELFARE MAGNET
States vary considerably in their willingness to provide welfare benefits to
low-income families. In 1991, the maximum annual combined cash and food
stamp benefits for a family of four varied between $5952 in Mississippi and
$11,898 in California. 14 The variation in cash benefits among states was even
greater in 1990 than it had been in 1940.11 States whose welfare benefits are
relatively high have become welfare magnets-places that attract poor people
because they offer higher cash benefits than other states. The higher the
benefits, the more magnetic the state-as high benefits keep poor people from
moving elsewhere while attracting additional poor people into the state.
Professor Mark Rom and I estimate that after five years a high benefit state
will have, ceteris paribus, a poverty rate approximately one percentage point
12. Id. at 109.
13. Id. at 110.
14. 1991 GREEN BOOK, at 1209, tbl. 11, cited in PETERSON, supra note 2, at 122.
15. Id. The aphorism, race to the bottom, should not be taken literally. It does not necessarily mean
all states will some day have exactly the same low benefits. One must expect that other fac-
tors-differences in per capita income, poverty, ethnic make-up and partisan composition-will continue
to shape policy. As the race continues, the differences among states could actually increase, as some
states become terminator states, that is states that totally eliminate state contributions to welfare policy.
Such policy decisions can be expected to put great downward pressure on the benefits provided by other
states, even though they would not eliminate interstate differences.
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higher than a low benefit state.16
Before 1970, differences in state welfare policies had little magnetic effect.
Numerous state laws and administrative practices were designed to make access
to the welfare system difficult, and discouraged changing residences merely to
improve one's welfare opportunities. Many states denied welfare benefits to
anyone who had not lived in the state for a year. AFDC benefits did not open
the door to food stamps and Medicaid. Thus, before 1969, states could increase
their welfare benefits without becoming a more attractive place of residence for
poor people in other parts of the country.
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled in Shapiro v. Thompson"7 that denying
welfare benefits to newcomers unconstitutionally denied them equal protection
before the law. This decision, along with the liberalization of many other state
administrative practices and the increase in the range of benefits offered,
increased the desirability of welfare benefits, reduced the stigma to which
recipients were subjected, and facilitated access to the welfare rolls, especially
for those moving from one state to another.
Once newcomers could obtain welfare benefits, state officials became
increasingly concerned about becoming welfare magnets. Kenneth Scheve, Jr.,
Mark Rom, and I have estimated the effects of neighboring states benefit levels
on a state's average AFDC benefits. Our estimate, based on annual data for the
years 1976 to 1989, took into account interstate differences in tax capacity, the
balance of political power between the two parties in the state legislature and
gubernatorial office, and the state's poverty rate. We found that for every $100
change in the benefit levels in neighboring states the preceding year, a state
altered its benefits by $30.8 Benefits were further cut if a state's poverty
population was on the increase. States were acting as if they were in a
competitive race with each other.
VII. INTENSIFYING THE RACE To THE BOTLoM
These cuts in welfare benefits occurred despite the fact that the federal
government paid at least half of all incremental costs. If block grants are
enacted, the cost of becoming a welfare magnet will double. The block grant
16. PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL
STANDARD (1990). This estimate is confirmed by an out-of-sample prediction for the 1986-1990 period.
See PETERSON, supra note 2, at 125. Though studies show that migration is also affected by job
opportunities and family relationships, similar effects of welfare benefits on the residential choices of
the poor are reported in Rebecca M. Blank, The Impact of State Economic Differentials on Household
Welfare and Labor Force Behavior, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 25-58 (1985); Edward M. Gramlich & Deborah
S. Laren, Migration and Income Redistribution Responsibilities, 19 J. HuM. RESOURCES 489 (1984);
and Lawrence Southwick, Jr., Public Welfare Programs and Recipient Migration, 12:4 GROWTH AND
CHANGE 22-32 (1981).
17. 349 U.S. 618 (1969).
18. Paul E. Peterson, et al., State Welfare Policy: A Race to the Bottom? (Feb. 1996) (Occasional
Paper, Harvard Univ., Dep't of Gov't, Ctr. for Political Studies).
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proposed under the 1996 Congressional Budget Resolution was a fixed sum of
money that did not change with the number of individuals in the state eligible
for assistance. If enacted, when poor people move to states with more generous
benefits, these states would experience an increase in their welfare burden
without any commensurate increase in federal funding. To safeguard against
rapidly rising state welfare costs, generous states would come under increasing
fiscal and political pressure to reduce their benefits. Eventually, all states
would be engaged in the race for the bottom, each state trying to shift the cost
of welfare to its neighbors.
The pressure on state budgets will be intensified by the fact that the block
grant that each state receives is not scheduled to increase despite the fact that
inflation has been climbing by an average of three percent a year, enough to
reduce the real value of the block grant by approximately one-fourth over
seven years. In addition, most states will experience overall population growth.
Even if poverty rates remain constant, the raw number of potential welfare
recipients will increase unless states tighten welfare eligibility standards. Some
states will inevitably experience a recession, either as part of national economic
slowdown or as a result of economic changes that have disproportionate
regional economic impacts (such as the effects of the early 1980s collapse in
energy prices on the Texas and Louisiana economies). All of the additional
costs generated by inflation, population growth, and economic slowdowns will
be borne entirely by state governments. To keep these costs from breaking
their budgets, some states will cut benefits and eligibility standards dramatical-
ly. Poor people will have even stronger incentives to locate in higher benefit,
more permissive states. High benefit states will be under intensified pressure
to match cuts made elsewhere. A race to the bottom is virtually assured.
VIII. MEDICAID MAGNETS
Should Medicaid be incorporated into a block grant program, the race to
the bottom could become deadly. Seventy percent of Medicaid funds are spent
in providing services to a disabled and elderly population whose Medicare
benefits have expired. The remaining 30% provide health care benefits to low
income families. Both aspects of Medicaid have reduced inequities in the
utilization of health care. Since Medicaid services have been available, low
birth weight and infant mortality rates have fallen, children from poor families
are more likely to use hospital facilities, and differential access between
children from poor and nonpoor families has been noticeably reduced.
Like AFDC, Medicaid is currently an entitlement program. A person or
family is entitled to receive Medicaid benefits if income and resource eligibility
requirements are met. These eligibility requirements are set by states, subject
to certain federal guidelines. The federal government pays for at least one-half
the cost of Medicaid services in all states. In states with low per capita
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incomes, the federal government pays a higher share of program costs.
Increases in the cost of a state's Medicaid program are borne either equally by
the state and the federal government or disproportionately by the federal
government.
The national framework for Medicaid has helped provide better coverage
to needy groups, especially low-income pregnant women and their children. In
1986, Congress expanded coverage to all pregnant women and infants living
in families with incomes below the poverty line. In 1990, Medicaid was
expanded to cover all children living in poverty up to the age of nineteen. The
impact of these new federal standards on state policy has been considerable.
The uniform, minimum floor for coverage (for pregnant women and children)
established in 1992 was two to three times higher than the coverage provided
by the average state only four years earlier. As a result of both policy and
demographic changes, the cost of Medicaid has increased rapidly, growing
from $31 billion in 1975 to $73 billion in 1990. Today it is by far the largest
of all safety net programs.
Despite overall growth in Medicaid and generous federal assistance which
helps alleviate state Medicaid costs, states are still sensitive to the likelihood
they might become a Medicaid magnet. Following procedures similar to those
used to estimate competitive effects on AFDC policy, Mark Rom, Ken Scheve,
and I estimated the effects of per recipient expenditures of neighboring states
on a state's own Medicaid expenditures for the years 1976 and 1989. Our
estimate controlled for the composition of the Medicaid population, as well for
tax capacity, poverty rates, and party strength. We found that Medicaid
expenditures per recipient were reduced by $13 for every $100 a state's benefit
level the previous year had exceeded that of the average contiguous state. 19
As with welfare, states take into account Medicaid benefits in neighboring
states when setting their own.
The race to the bottom can be expected to increase if proposed Medicaid
policies are enacted. The proposed 4% increase in the Medicaid block grant is
expected to be sufficient to cover only anticipated demographic changes, such
as overall population growth and increases in the size of the elderly and
disabled populations (whose services account for approximately 71% of
Medicaid costs). But after two years, nothing is budgeted for inflation, despite
the fact that in recent years overall inflation has averaged about 3 % a year and
health care costs have been rising at around 6%. After two years, any increase
in the cost of the program beyond 4% would be borne entirely by the state
government.
19. Paul E. Peterson, et al., State Welfare and Medicaid Policy: A Race to the Bottom? (Paper
prepared for the Nat'l Ass'n for Welfare Res. & Stat. Ann. Res. Conference, Jackson, WY, Sept. 10-
13, 1995).
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States will be under great fiscal pressure to race to the bottom. Medicaid
is already one of the fastest growing segments of state budgets. If states are
asked to bear all additional costs beyond the federal 4% increment, the burden
on many states is likely to be severe. Even if health care inflation can be
limited to overall rates of inflation, this increase plus demographic changes will
produce a natural increase in costs of 7%. States that experience a slowdown
in economic growth will face even greater demands on their Medicaid budgets,
as unemployed workers apply for coverage. Demands on the program can be
expected to intensify further with the drop in employer-funded health care
insurance. Under extreme fiscal pressure, some states will be forced to change
eligibility requirements, provider payments, and the range of covered services.
Poor people in need of costly medical services will have especially large
incentives to locate in places where medical benefits are more generous. As the
more generous states experience a rise in their low-income, medically needy
population, they will come under increasing pressure to match cuts that have
occurred elsewhere. The race to the bottom could become quite deadly.
IX. THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY
If Republican proposals in Congress are enacted into law, the competitive
pressures on states will certainly intensify. Yet the future of social policy will
also be affected by several economic and political factors that are easier to
identify than to predict.
If the economy continues to grow at its current pace, block grants, if
enacted, can be implemented without creating serious budgetary crises at state
and local levels. Likewise, if immediate problems do not arise, they could
become a more or less permanent of the governmental landscape. This scenario
is possible because moments of major change such as the country is currently
experiencing are typically followed by periods of stability. The creation of the
Great Society in 1965 and 1966 was followed by a period of consolidation.
Reagan introduced massive tax cuts and significant spending reductions in
1981; policy initiatives for the next decade amounted to little more than modest
refinements of the settlement reached in 1981. We may be in the midst of
another watershed moment.
Under these circumstances, that is if block grants are enacted and steady
economic growth continues, state welfare policy can be expected only to drift
toward the bottom. In most states, nominal expenditures will be maintained, if
only to avoid blame for cutting holes in the safety net. But benefit levels will
not keep pace with the cost of living, nor will funds increase in response to the
growing size of the population. Changes will not be so immediate and visible
as to create a sense of national crisis. The move toward the bottom could be
so much a "race" as a stately walk.
Should the economy deteriorate sharply in the near future, however,
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devolution could lead to state welfare policy crises. Economic downturns are
often concentrated in particularly hard-hit regions. As state fiscal revenues
falter, pressures to make sharp cuts in safety net expenditures will intensify.
The movement of low-income people from one state to another in search of
better social services will come to public notice. States will be forced to take
measures to avoid becoming havens for the poor. The race to the bottom could
quickly intensify. Demands for a national solution would escalate.
At the national level, an economic recession would cause a new budgetary
crisis. Once again, members of a Congress would have to balance tax policy
and senior citizen entitlements against further devolution of welfare policy.
Further cuts in the safety-net for poor families would certainly be placed on the
bargaining table. When looking for new places to cut, Congress could be
expected to turn its attention to the inequity built into the current block-grant
funding arrangements. New York and California are receiving much more aid
per recipient than are poor states, such as Arkansas and Mississippi, only
because in 1994 New York and California provided higher welfare benefits and
more medical services to a broader population. Could this be defended as
equitable? Would it be possible to further cut block grants to states receiving
disproportionately large subsidies?
Answers to these questions will depend on which party is blamed for an
economic recession, should it occur. The blame usually goes to the party
controlling the presidency at the onset of a recession. Depending on which
party gets blamed for the recession, an economic downturn could produce one
of two diametrically opposite consequences for welfare policy. If Republicans
get the blame, a resurgent Democratic party could halt and begin to reverse the
devolution begun in 1995. But if the Democrats are blamed for a recession, the
Republicans could solidify their hold on the national government and further
devolve responsibility for welfare policy.

